Impact of Increasing Capital Flows on the Real Economy and Financial Markets in Japan / Ineffectiveness of Monetary Policy Instruments by OHTA, Hideaki
Impact of Increasing Capital Flows on the Real Economy and Financial Markets in Japan: Ineffectiveness of Monetary Policy Instruments
 ( 115 )  115
Impact of Increasing Capital Flows on the Real 
Economy and Financial Markets in Japan:
Ineffectiveness of Monetary Policy Instruments
 Hideaki OHTA※
Abstract
This paper examines the effectiveness of monetary policy on domestic monetary 
and financial markets as well as the real economy in Japan under increasing 
capital flows in Japan from 2001 to 2013, based on the VAR (Vector autoregressive) 
model. The result shows that the monetary policy instruments (monetary base,the 
Bank of Japan current account, and call rate) have become increasingly influenced 
by capital flows recently. Particularly, the effects of capital flows, especially short-
term capital flows (portfolio, other investments, derivatives), have put significant 
impact on the major monetary policy variables. It is also shown that the excess 
reserves of the BOJ account may be utilized for financial investment, not for 
productive investment in the real economy. The monetary policy has thus become 
less effective in controlling the domestic market, as part of the policy tools used in 
reviving and expanding the real economy. Therefore, Bank of Japan is expected to 
take sensible monetary policy in the context of the global economic and market 
conditions, especially the international capital flows, which are significantly 
influenced by the monetary policy of advanced economies.
Introduction
The effects of monetary easing policies, particularly Quantitative Easing (QE) 
[2001-2006] on the financial market and the real economy, have been studied by 
several scholars, but there has not been any consensus whether such a policy has 
put positive impact on the real economy in Japan. Moreover, it would be important 
to consider the aspect of increasing international capital flows, which have put 
significant impact upon the capital market and monetary policies in any country 
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especially after the Global Financial Crisis (2008), under monetary easing policies 
adopted by advanced countries. 
This paper examines the effectiveness of Bank of Japan (BOJ)’s monetary 
policy on domestic monetary and financial markets as well as the real economy in 
Japan under increasing capital flows from April 2001 to August 2013, based on 
the VAR (Vector autoregressive) model.
Bank of Japan initiated the QE in 2001, which  was terminated in March 
2006, while BOJ continued the ‘Zero interest-rate’ policy introduced in 1999. 
Monetary easing policies have been introduced not only in Japan, but also the 
USA and Europe since the Global Financial Crisis, triggered by the ‘Lehman 
Shock’ in September 2008. BOJ introduced Comprehensive Monetary Easing since 
2010, which is followed by Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing (QQE) 
Policy. QQE includes the program of asset purchase, with bond buying by US$1.4 
trillion in two years , started under the new Governor Kuroda in Spring 2013.
The global market has bottomed out, and stock prices in Tokyo as well as New 
York have gone up significantly since December 2012, when the FRB introduced 
the additional policy of third round of quantitative easing (QE3). The new phase 
of QE3 includes large-scale asset purchases, through trading of Government 
Bonds (T-Bills) with the amount of $ 85 billion per month in addition to mortgage-
backed securities (MBS). This measure have resulted in massive capital flows in 
the global market.
The monetary and financial market in Japan has become increasingly 
influenced by the global capital flows, and that has affected the domestic 
monetary policy by the Bank of Japan recently. The new QQE policy pushed up 
stock prices with depreciation of exchange rate of Yen byMay 2013. However, such 
a measure has not directly increased in bank lending and the domestic industrial 
production. In this regard, the monetary easing policy of FRB’s QE2 also has not 
been proved as effective in reviving the US economy.1
The global liquidity has been increased by the quantitative monetary easing 
policy introduced in major advanced countries, including the US monetary easing 
(QE2 and QE3), and such policies have increasingly influenced on the monetary 
policy in many countries. Japanese monetary market is also considered to be 
1. Martin Feldstein argues that QE2 led to a rise in the stock market, which in turn 
contributed to increasing consumption and the strong performance of the US economy in late 
2010 (Statement on 24 February 2011). However, QE2 has put significant effect on the pressure 
for currency appreciation and inflation, and the higher commodity prices in the global market, 
while the effects on the domestic economy is not significant. The effect of QE3 is also questioned 
by Mr. Fischer, Governor of Dallas Reserve Boad (See Bloomberg dated 10th April, 2013).
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increasingly affected by the capital flows.
This paper has examined the effects of BOJ’s monetary policy on the market 
as well as the real economy during the period from April 2001 to August 2013, 
based on the analysis of VAR model, including variables such as monetary base, 
BOJ Current Account, as well as call money (overnight non collateral interbank 
rate).  The other variables include money stocks (M2), bond yield, real effective 
exchange rate, bank lending, and industrial production.
The major findings of the analysis obtained in this paper are summarized as 
follows:
First, the BOJ’s monetary policy has become increasingly ineffective, in the 
sense that any monetary policy instrument (BOJ Current Account, Base Money, 
and Call Rate) has put insignificant effect on the monetary and financial market 
as well as the real economy over the whole period 2.
Second, the domestic monetary easing policy has not been effective in 
expanding the productive activities and there has not been causal relationship 
between monetary policy variables and industrial production.
Third, monetary easing policy has become ineffective in providing positive 
impact on the stock market since 2006, so that there is no significant effect on 
industrial production even indirectly via stock markets.
Fourth, those monetary policy variables have strengthened causal relationship 
with short-term capital flows, and that also affected the domestic monetary and 
financial market recently, especially after the Global Financial Crisis.
1. Research on Monetary Policy in Japan
A number of studies have been undertaken on monetary policy and its effects 
on the monetary/financial market as well as the real economy in Japan, but past 
studies mostly have focused on the period of QE (2001-2006) very few research on 
the impact of monetary policy on the economy and the domestic market after 2006 
has been undertaken until today. Moreover, the studies in the past mainly focused 
on the domestic market variables, and there are very few studies which deal with 
evaluation on the monetary policy and its effects on the financial and real 
economy, taking into consideration the effects of capital flows in Japan.
Several studies suggest that the QE (2001-2006) in Japan put the bond yield 
lower and had certain impact on the maturity of the bonds. For example, Okina 
2. Noguchi(2013b) maintais that monetary easing policies in Japan as well as that in the USA 
have not resulted in positive effect on the real economy.
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and Shiratsuka (2004) and Baba et al. (2006) indicated that the monetary easing 
policy did lower the yield curve of the government bond (JGB) with longer period, 
but the effects on the price levels and the real economy were limited. Ugai (2006) 
also suggested that there was some lower risk premium during the QE period 
(2001-2006). Kimura and Small (2006) indicated that some effect on portfolio 
rebalance, which shows that risk premium is higher for stock prices, while that of 
corporate bonds with higher credit ratings is lower after the introduction of the 
QE.
Shirakawa (2008,2009), on the other hand, pointed out that the effect of QE 
on the real economy was insignificant, while he admitted some certain effect on 
the overall stability of monetary system was observed in Japan. Shiratsuka et al. 
(2010) also pointed out that QE might put expectation of easing policy to be 
positive among the private sector, but the effect on the real economy is limited.
Komiya (2002) criticized ineffectiveness of the monetary easing policy in the 
sense that it could not increase in the money stocks. Noguchi (2013a) also 
maintains that monetary easing policy has not been effective in putting positive 
impact upon the real economy, and that it would be difficult to put the economy 
out from deflation, though he admited that some effect in terms of the policy 
duration effect of the government bonds and yield curve.
Monetary policy should be used to have impact on the real economy (GDP), 
and in this respect, Voutsinas and Werner (2011) insists that bank credit growth 
as one of the more orthodox intermediary targets should be emphasized, and 
maintains that the Quantitative Easing policy in Japan during 2001-2006 was not 
very effective to achieve a stable long-term relationship with nominal GDP growth.
Major analyses based on VAR models on the monetary policy in Japan have 
been initiated in the 2000s, including the work by Teruyama (2001), which shows 
monetary policy had become ineffective, but the study was confined to the analysis 
in the 1990s. The major studies on monetary policy cover almost all the period of 
Quantitative Easing Policy (QE) (2001-2006). Harada and Masujima (2008) 
pointed out the effectiveness the Quantitative Monetary Easing on the real 
economy through stock market, based on the VAR model. Honda, Kuroki and 
Tachibana (2010) also show the effectiveness of monetary easing policy (2001-
2006) by adopting variables of CPI, industrial production, call rate, BOJ Current 
Account, Nikkei stock prices, and industrial production, based the VAR models. 
The study by Honda and Tachibana (2011) extended the covered period from 1996 
to March 2010, including dummy variable for the period of Quantitative Monetary 
Easing (2001-2006), and claims that monetary policy was effective in increasing 
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industrial production through the route of stock market. Honda (2013) further 
indicates that significance of ‘Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing’ 
since 2013 in terms of expanding the monetary base.
These studies based on the VAR models are basically analyses of the 
Quantitative Easing Policy period (2001-2006), but not covered more recent period 
until today. Therefore, the results of previous studies may not be valid for the 
discussion on the period after 2006. Most studies in the past have not examined 
the effects of monetary easing policy after the ‘Lehman Shock’ (2008), including 
the BOJ’s Comprehensive Monetary Easing (CME) since 2010, and the current 
QQE Policy Phase since Spring 2013.
It should not be underestimated that the impact of capital flows on the 
domestic  monetary and financial markets and monetary policy in Japan. Recent 
cross-border capital flows, especially short-term capital, have put significant effect 
on the global market. Despite the fact that international capital flows have put 
significant impact upon the domestic market and the real economy, the major past 
studies have not taken up the aspect of international context of the effects of 
capital flows on the domestic monetary and financial markets, as well as domestic 
monetary policy in Japan 3.
This paper analyses the effects of monetary easing policy in Japan, not only 
during 2001-2006 but also the ‘post’ QE period, from 2006 until 2013(August), 
based on the VAR models. The results of the study show that monetary policy 
variables (monetary base and BOJ Current Account, call rate) have been 
ineffective in controlling the monetary and financial markets, as well as the real 
economy. It also shows that the effect of monetary policy has now become 
ineffective in providing positive impact upon the industrial production, not only 
through bank lending but also though the channel of stock market recently. This 
could be due to capital flows under theFRB’s monetary easing policy, especially 
QE2(October 2010 to June 2011), as well as the current QE3.
2. Monetary Policy and Financial Market in Japan
Monetary base in Japan has increased significantly, as compared with the 
early 2000s, and it amounted to 98.8 trillion Yen as of Octoer 2013 (Fig.1). On the 
other hand, call rate has remained in low level, except the period between 2006 
and 2008 (Fig.2).
3. In this regard, Miyao(2006) shows that monetary policy had become ineffective in the 1990s 
through the analysis based on VAR model.
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The size of the monetary base and BOJ Current Account in Japan are almost 
36% of GDP (estimated as of September 2013) and 18.7%, higher than that of the 
USA with 20.8% and 13.6%, respectively(Fig.3).
Fig.1 Monetary Base and BOJ Current Account
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Despite such a monetary easing policy, industrial production has not increased 
until today (Fig.4) The money stock (M2) has no close correlation with the industrial 
production, and it suggests that bank has not provided lending the productive sector 
(Fig.5).
Capital flows have influenced on domestic money stocks (M2), which is shown 
by the fact that the changes in M2 have negative correlation with capital flows 
(Fig.6). This could indicate that money stock held in the domestic financial sector 
has been mobilized for overseas lending and financial investment, not in the 
domestic market.This trend has become significant in recent years after the 
Global Financial Crisis. Thus, money stock is closely linked to the overseas market 
under the current regime of capital market liberalization. It is necessary, 
therefore, that monetary policy should be analysed under the context of capital 
flows that put significant effects on the domestic market.
Fig.4 Monetary Base & Industrial Production (Japan)
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3.  Vector Auto regression (VAR) Model and Analysis on Monetary 
Policy
This section is devoted to explanation on the VAR (Vector auto regression) 
model to be used for analysis on the effects of monetary policy on monetary and 
capital/ financial market, foreign exchange, as well as the real economy in Japan 
in the next section (Section4) . The effects of capital flows on the monetary policy 
variables are also examined by the VAR in Section 5.
The variables (monthly) include Bank of Japan Current Account (BOJ AC), 
Monetary Base (MB), Call Rate, Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER), CPI, 
Money Stock (M2), Government bond yield(Yield), Nikkei stock prices (Nikkei), 
Industrial production (seasonally adjusted, [Prod]), Bank Lending. Capital Flows 
variables include: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI); Portfolio Investment 
(Portfolio); Other Investment (Other), Derivatives (Derivative). Logarithm is used 
for BOJAC, MB, REER, M2, and Nikkei.
The whole period (2001-2013) is divided into four periods:
( i ) Quantitative Monetary Easing Period (April 2001- March 2006)
( ii ) Period until ‘Lehman Shock’(April 2006 – August 2008)
(iii) Post-Global Financial Crisis Period (September 2008 – February 2011)
(iv)  Comprehensive Monetary Easing (CME) and Quantitative and Qualitative 
Monetary Easing (QQE) by Japan (March 2011 – August 2013)
 The sources of variables are used as follows:
Fig.6 Capital Flows (Net) and M2 (Japan)
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Variables Abbriviation Sources
Bank of Japan Current Account BOJ AC Bank of Japan (major data series)
BOJ Monetary Base Monetary Base (MB) Bank of Japan (major data series)
Overnight interbank rate Call Rate Bank of Japan (major data series)
Capital Flows（FDI、Portfolio Bank of Japan (major data series)
Investment, Other Investment FDI, Portfolio, Other, Derivative
Derivative)
Real Effective Exchange Rate REER BIS effective exchange rate indices
Consumer price index CPI Statistical Office (Japan), International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) database (IMF)
Money Stocks M2 Bank of Japan (major data series)
Government Bond Yields Yield IFS database (IMF)
Nikkei Stock Prices Stock(Nikkei) Nikkei Profile database
http://indexes.nikkei.co.jp/nkave/archives/data
Bank Lending Lending(y/y) Bank of Japan (major data series)
Industrial Production Production(Prod) （2005＝ 100） IFS database (IMF)
3.1 Vector Auto Regression (VAR) Model
The VAR model used in this paper is based on the equation given below. The first 
shock is provided by the monetary policy instruments (variables), including BOJ 
Current Account (BOJAC), Monetary Base, and Call Rate. The other variables 
include market variables such as money stocks(M2), average government bond 
yield (Yield), and Stock Prices(Nikkei), as well as other variables of Banks’ 
lending (Lend), Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER), Consumer Price Index 
(CPI), Industrial Production (Prod), Industrial Production (Prod).
The order of each variables of the VAR model is determined by the shock of 
the monetary policy and the impact on the market and the real economy.
Yt = c + A1Yt-1 + A2Yt-2 +   ... + ApYp-l + Bεt
Where  c is constant vector matrix;  At ：(n×n) matrix; εt：(n×1) Shock Vector;
B：εt (n×l)：matrix for changing the disturbance term vector (ut) (ut = Bεt)
The variables are in principle are used for the analysis with first-order 
difference to have stationality, except some variables which are used at level 
include the industrial production (y/y), FDI. The lag order by SIC (Schwarz 
criterion, or Bayesian information criterion, BIC), Variables：BOJAC [or MB or 
Call Rate], REER, CPI, Nikkei, Production.
VAR Models are for estimating the impact of monetary policy shocks on the 
domestic monetary/financial markets and industrial production (for Model 1) and 
that of monetary policy on the foreign exchange, as well as industrial production 
via stock markets (for Model 2). The effects of capital flows on monetary policy 
variables are analysed by Model 3.The models include the following variables, and 
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the Choleski ordering is determined as the shock of monetary policy variables and 
relevant variables as follows:
[Model 1]1： Effects of Monetary Policy on the monetary and financial market 
and production
( i )  Monetary policy variables: BOJ Current Account Balance 
(BOJAC); Monetary Base (MB); Call Rate
( ii )  Market variables: money stocks (M2);  average government 
bond yield (Yield);  Bank lending (Lend);  Industrial 
Production (Prod)
[Model 2] 1： Effects of Monetary Policy on the foreign exchange rate , price 
and capital market, as well as industrial production
 ( i )  Monetary policy variables: BOJ Current Account Balance 
(BOJAC); Monetary Base (MB); Call Rate
 ( ii )  Foreign exchange market and other market variables: Real 
Effective Exchange Rate (REER); Consumer Price Index 
(CPI); Stock Prices(Nikkei); Industrial Production (Prod) 
1Analysis presented in Section 4.
[Model 3]2：Effects of (i)capital flows (net) on (ii)monetary policy variables
 ( i )  Foreign Direct Investment (FDI); Portfolio Investment 
(Portfolio); Other Investment (Other), Derivatives (Derivative)
 ( ii )  Monetary policy variables: BOJ Current Account Balance 
(BOJAC); Monetary Base (MB); Call Rate  
2 Analysis presented in Section 5.
3.2 ADF Test and Stationarity of variables
Prior to the analysis based on VAR models, stationarity of the variables involved 
in the regression is tested by ADF (augmented Dickey-Fuller) method for the unit 
root tests (Table 1). FDI, derivatives, industrial production (y/y) has unit root 
without first lag. the ADF test results show that unit root is rejected for the first 
lag of other variables, which is expressed as I (1). 
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2001-2006 ADF t-adf p-value lag signifi-cance model ADF t-adf p-value lag
signifi-
cance model
BOJAC level -3.40 0.0147 0 ** intercept 1st diff -3.00 0.042 7 *** intercept
  (log) -1.42 0.844 0 intercept, trend -4.51 0.004 7 *** intercept, trend
Monetary Bas level -5.11 0.000 7 *** intercept 1st diff -2.87 0.055 2 * intercept
  (log) -2.12 0.525 7 intercept, trend -4.39 0.005 2 *** intercept, trend
Call Rate level -2.89 0.052 0 * intercept 1st diff -7.82 0.000 0 *** intercept
-2.92 0.163 0 intercept, trend -4.23 0.008 9 *** intercept, trend
FDI level -6.92 0.000 0 *** intercept 1st diff -8.2 0.000 2 *** intercept
-7.18 0.000 0 *** intercept, trend -8.1 0.000 2 *** intercept, trend
Portfolio level -1.97 0.299 5 intercept 1st diff -9.51 0.000 4 *** intercept
-2.85 0.186 5 intercept, trend -9.37 0.000 4 *** intercept, trend
Other level -1.54 0.506 5 intercept 1st diff -8.49 0.000 4 *** intercept
-2.23 0.462 5 intercept, trend -8.37 0.000 4 *** intercept, trend
Derivative -4.95 0.000 0 *** intercept -10.6 0.000 0 *** intercept
-5.16 0.000 0 *** intercept, trend -10.5 0.000 0 *** intercept, trend
REER level -0.21 0.931 0 intercept 1st diff. -6.92 0.000 0 *** intercept
(log) -1.53 0.809 0 intercept, trend -6.87 0.000 0 *** intercept, trend
CPI level -2.14 0.232 0 intercept 1st diff. -7.72 0.000 0 *** intercept
(y/y) -2.73 0.229 0 intercept, trend -6.68 0.000 1 *** intercept, trend
M2䠄log) level -1.25 0.646 10 intercept 1st diff. -9.78 0.000 1 *** intercept
-3.07 0.125 11 intercept, trend -9.79 0.000 1 *** intercept, trend
Yield(Govt) level -1.50 0.525 0 intercept 1st diff -7.28 0.000 0 *** intercept
-1.81 0.686 0 intercept, trend -7.28 0.000 0 *** intercept, trend
Stock(Nikkei) level -0.14 0.939 0 intercept 1st diff -5.73 0.000 0 *** intercept
Price -1.77 0.708 0 intercept, trend -6.41 0.000 0 *** intercept, trend
Lending level 2.26 1.000 0 intercept 1st diff -6.23 0.000 0 *** intercept
(y/y) -0.31 0.989 0 intercept, trend -7.99 0.000 0 *** intercept, trend
Production level 0.08 0.962 1 intercept 1st diff -9.80 0.000 0 *** intercept
䠄S.A.) -4.07 0.012 1 ** intercept, trend -10.03 0.000 0 *** intercept, trend
2006-2013 ADF t-adf p-value lag signifi-cance model ADF t-adf p-value lag
signifi-
cance model
BOJAC level 0.67 0.991 0 intercept 1st diff -10.07 0.000 0 *** intercept
  (log) -4.92 0.0007 0 *** intercept, trend -10.7 0.000 0 *** intercept, trend
Monetary Bas level 3.14 1.000 2 intercept 1st diff -4.46 0.001 2 *** intercept
  (log) 0.13 0.997 2 intercept, trend -9.10 0.000 1 *** intercept, trend
Call Rate level -1.72 0.419 1 intercept 1st diff -5.25 0.000 0 *** intercept
-3.20 0.091 1 * intercept, trend -5.32 0.000 0 *** intercept, trend
FDI level -9.20 0.000 1 *** none 1st diff -10.6 0.000 1 *** none
-9.52 0.000 0 *** intercept -10.6 0.000 1 *** intercept
Portfolio level -2.05 0.040 6 ** none 1st diff -9.85 0.000 4 *** none
-1.97 0.298 6 intercept -5.00 0.001 10 *** intercept
Other level -4.09 0.002 2 *** none 1st diff -8.58 0.000 4 *** none
-2.31 0.423 5 intercept -8.49 0.000 4 *** intercept
Derivative level -2.98 0.041 1 *** none 1st diff -8.58 0.000 0 *** intercept
-3.00 0.003 1 *** intercept -8.49 0.000 0 *** intercept, trend
REER level -1.62 0.469 1 intercept 1st diff. -6.23 0.000 0 *** intercept
(log) -1.51 0.819 1 intercept, trend -6.24 0.000 0 *** intercept, trend
CPI level -2.34 0.162 1 intercept 1st diff. -6.33 0.000 0 *** intercept
(y/y) -2.26 0.450 1 intercept, trend -6.33 0.000 0 *** intercept, trend
M2㸦log) level 3.64 1.000 10 intercept 1st diff. -7.26 0.000 0 *** intercept
-2.29 0.433 11 intercept, trend (y/y) -7.25 0.000 0 *** intercept, trend
Yield(Govt) level -1.58 0.487 0 none 1st diff -10.10 0.000 0 *** none
-4.82 0.001 0 *** intercept -10.03 0.000 0 *** intercept
Stock(Nikkei) level -1.51 0.526 0 intercept 1st diff -7.66 0.000 0 *** intercept
Price -0.48 0.983 0 intercept, trend -7.80 0.000 0 *** intercept, trend
Lending level -1.71 0.421 1 intercept 1st diff -5.50 0.000 0 *** intercept
(y/y) -1.61 0.781 1 intercept, trend -5.50 0.000 0 *** intercept, trend
Production level -1.84 0.359 1 intercept 1st diff -7.13 0.000 0 *** intercept
䠄S.A.) -2.18 0.492 1 intercept, trend -7.08 0.000 0 *** intercept, trend
Note: The period is from April 2006 to August 2013 (to July 2013 for Capital flows [FDI, Portfolio, Other, Derivative]) 
Source: Author's calculation based on Bank of Japan and IFS database (IMF)
Table 1: Augumented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Japan)
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The variables which are confirmed stationarity with the first lag are as 
follows:
 Portfolio; Other Investment; BOJ Current Account; Monetary Base; Real 
effective exchange rate (REER); Money Stock (M2); Nikkei Average (Nikkei); 
CPI (y/y); Average Government Bond yield (Yield); Bank Lending (Lend).
It should be noted that some of the variables including Portfolio and Other 
investment show stationarity without first lag, depending on the period. The 
analyses based on the VAR models used the variables with first order difference, 
depending on the ADF test results.
3.3 Granger Causality Test
This section focuses on the causality between the variables of monetary policy and 
foreign exchange rates, monetary and financial markets, as well as the real 
economy (industrial production). Granger causality tests are essentially those 
measures to improve in forecasting association and correlation between the 
variables. By using an F-test to jointly test for the significance of the lags on the 
explanatory variables, this in effect tests for ‘Granger causality’ between these 
variables.
The analysis is based on the monthly data of each variable during the period 
April 2001 to August 2013, dividing 2001-2006 (Quantitative Easing), 2006-2008 
(Post QE), 2008-2011 (Post Global Financial Crisis), and 2011-2013 (Comprehensive 
Monetary Easing and New Quantitative & Qualitative Easing Phase). The results 
of Granger Causality test of each variable, with the average of the first, 2nd, 3rd 
and 4th (quarter) lags are summarized in Table2.
Among the monetary policy variables, BOJ Current Account (BOJAC) Granger 
causes Nikkei stock prices, and Nikkei has Granger Causes industrial production 
(Prod) during the period 2001-2006, which indicates that there was causality route 
from BOJAC to Industrial production through the stock market. However, causality 
from BOJAC to industrial production and Nikkei to industrial production became 
insignificant after 2006, during the whole periods from 2006 to 2013.
Thus, the causality between the domestic monetary policy and the capital and 
financial market has become insignificant recently. In this regard, the period 
2008-2011 was some special period when the Global Financial Crisis hit the global 
market, so that the significant causality from BOJAC and monetary base (MB) to 
Nikkei was not positive but negative one, as it is shown in the next section of 
impulse response functions.
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BOJ Current Account and bank lending have no direct causal relationship 
with industrial production during the whole period of 2001-2013. This result 
suggests that industrial production by Japanese firms, especially large firms, have 
not been dependent on monetary base and bank loans 4. In this regard, it could be 
related to the significant monetary easing that was introduced in global scale.
4. The corporate profit of Japanese firms increased by more than 60 % (y/y) and reached to 
US$62.9 billion in November 2011. This would account for the decrease in the Japanese firms’ 
dependence on the bank loans significantly (Reuters 2012).
Table 2: Japan : Granger Causality (2001-2013) 
2001-2006 FDI Portfolio Other Derivative BOJAC MB Call Rate REER CPI M2 Yield Nikkkei Lend Prod
FDI 1.386 1.250 3.531 ** 0.832 0.509 1.328 0.152 0.134 0.279 0.599 2.389 0.070 0.873
Portfolio 1.358 1.758 4.248 ** 1.372 2.293 0.578 0.372 0.241 0.708 1.143 1.001 0.591 0.651
Other 0.811 1.573 4.518 ** 1.237 1.594 0.35 1.05 0.61 0.48 1.44 1.04 0.44 0.649
Derivative 2.888 * 2.725 * 3.739 ** 0.938 1.360 0.891 2.754 1.389 0.568 1.825 0.934 1.631 0.857
BOJAC 0.158 0.706 0.679 1.137 2.829 * 2.564 * 1.488 0.433 2.247 0.360 3.705 ** 0.755 0.652
MB 0.100 2.034 1.525 0.766 0.561 1.110 1.544 0.574 2.273 0.376 0.829 1.372 1.665
Call Rate 0.661 0.124 0.22 0.492 2.036 1.225 0.571 0.084 1.029 0.615 2.008 0.853 3.375 *
REER 2.788 * 0.575 0.49 5.424 ** 2.274 1.859 2.574 1.448 0.899 1.085 2.187 0.553 0.203
CPI 2.064 0.406 0.14 3.682 ** 0.492 0.398 0.491 1.961 2.491 1.228 1.922 1.355 0.572
M2 2.287 0.331 0.56 0.842 0.589 0.783 0.093 4.026 ** 0.431 1.751 0.161 2.907 * 1.429
Yield 0.472 0.325 0.34 0.779 0.421 0.278 0.654 0.579 1.308 1.033 1.695 1.737 2.607 *
Nikkei 3.548 ** 5.307 ** 3.41 * 4.710 ** 1.967 2.651 * 1.652 1.034 0.208 0.532 1.971 1.418 3.317 *
Lend 1.097 1.434 2.6 * 1.974 2.003 1.330 0.101 0.472 0.514 1.383 0.470 0.578 0.089
Prod 0.713 2.754 2.24 0.747 1.364 1.038 1.163 1.706 0.629 1.291 0.631 0.258 1.186
2006-2008 FDI Portfolio Other Derivative BOJAC MB Call Rate REER CPI M2 Yield Nikkei Lend Prod
FDI 0.924 0.782 2.437 2.504 2.501 0.307 0.290 0.356 1.165 0.439 0.689 1.279 0.344
Portfolio 0.918 0.259 0.873 3.622 2.450 3.192 2.243 0.087 0.320 0.432 0.512 1.071 1.359
Other 0.770 0.570 0.862 3.020 2.282 2.570 2.459 0.148 0.349 0.461 0.408 0.978 1.405
Derivative 0.249 1.691 1.669 0.893 1.030 0.068 0.635 0.773 0.677 0.697 1.768 1.046 0.335
BOJAC 0.708 1.210 1.625 0.161 1.064 0.764 0.120 3.713 ** 1.647 0.626 0.507 0.436 0.337
MB 0.782 1.910 2.090 0.198 2.070 0.62 0.116 0.612 5.326 ** 0.278 0.66 0.455 0.322
Call Rate 1.661 0.651 0.831 0.849 0.314 0.18 0.774 0.740 0.364 0.803 0.8 1.022 0.336
REER 1.267 0.717 0.435 1.580 2.702 * 0.623 0.940 0.850 0.697 0.924 0.862 1.215 0.869
CPI 0.617 0.310 0.552 0.211 0.588 0.213 0.771 0.218 1.390 0.121 1.314 4.115 7.990 ***
M2 0.648 0.765 1.112 1.315 1.386 0.628 0.374 1.145 1.636 0.206 4.224 ** 1.678 0.148
Yield 0.546 1.337 1.393 1.453 0.69 1.59 0.16 1.473 2.911 * 0.704 0.52 0.421 0.718
Nikkei 0.623 1.933 1.679 6.343 0.700 0.26 0.34 2.808 * 0.295 2.532 * 0.086 0.648 0.113
Lend 0.468 0.332 0.091 1.942 1.018 0.520 1.436 0.822 0.614 0.400 0.160 2.614 4.033 **
Prod 0.830 3.599 3.788 0.37 0.39 0.61 1.12 1.995 1.167 0.314 0.614 1.43 1.355
2008-2011 FDI Portfolio Other Derivative BOJAC MB Call Rate REER CPI M2 Yield Nikkei Lend Prod
FDI 0.797 1.548 0.501 1.718 1.257 17.61 *** 0.489 0.425 0.383 1.661 0.274 1.613 2.184
Portfolio 0.701 0.256 1.257 5.501 *** 2.801 * 2.233 1.520 0.468 5.296 ** 0.541 1.668 2.345 0.556
Other 0.855 0.398 1.233 4.237 ** 2.529 * 3.142 * 0.816 0.370 4.318 ** 0.583 1.346 2.185 0.827
Derivative 1.453 1.936 2.248 3.131 * 4.359 ** 20.04 *** 0.350 0.618 0.151 1.730 0.183 1.926 4.210
BOJAC 1.467 1.140 1.492 0.934 0.781 1.406 0.661 1.321 0.113 1.310 5.604 *** 0.516 0.730
MB 1.612 2.381 2.453 1.966 1.017 1.619 1.683 0.866 0.500 0.570 3.614 ** 0.362 0.665
Call Rate 3.343 * 2.897 * 3.025 * 2.055 4.884 ** 2.048 1.688 0.471 0.669 2.392 0.931 1.141 8.152 ***
REER 1.498 3.870 ** 3.428 * 5.040 ** 2.363 1.245 10.91 *** 2.318 1.074 2.115 1.882 3.579 5.559 ***
CPI 3.955 * 2.618 * 3.064 * 2.182 0.795 1.541 3.716 ** 0.699 1.472 1.703 1.155 11.69 *** 3.338 *
M2 0.645 0.224 0.328 0.524 1.248 1.621 2.186 0.248 0.757 0.400 0.660 3.925 *** 1.655
Yield 0.506 0.499 0.850 1.446 0.788 0.317 0.973 0.962 1.186 1.018 1.507 0.115 0.629
Nikkei 1.242 3.441 * 3.352 * 5.203 ** 2.727 * 2.313 6.274 *** 2.152 0.866 0.581 0.939 1.734 2.140
Lend 3.358 * 4.053 ** 6.248 *** 0.265 1.169 0.614 1.165 0.481 2.376 2.114 0.395 1.291 1.395
Prod 0.781 3.086 * 2.506 * 1.771 5.253 ** 1.541 2.326 1.827 1.438 1.515 0.591 0.671 2.100
2011-2013 FDI Portfolio Other Derivative BOJAC MB Call Rate REER CPI M2 Yield Nikkei Lend Prod
FDI 0.382 0.892 1.034 1.010 0.708 2.894 0.936 0.500 1.730 1.514 0.191 2.245 0.832
Portfolio 0.907 0.097 0.896 4.192 ** 3.689 ** 4.279 ** 0.929 0.502 2.610 * 1.427 3.474 ** 0.966 0.682
Other 1.261 0.752 0.522 3.169 * 3.100 * 4.016 ** 0.819 0.943 1.943 1.728 3.656 ** 0.283 0.594
Derivative 1.580 6.371 *** 2.876 * 3.620 ** 4.537 ** 2.046 0.817 1.381 0.981 1.217 1.210 1.099 0.293
BOJAC 1.566 5.300 ** 3.967 ** 3.549 * 1.656 1.557 0.360 0.693 1.944 1.389 0.981 2.285 2.288
MB 2.030 7.955 *** 5.020 ** 2.690 * 1.464 1.249 0.258 0.361 2.319 2.088 0.812 1.989 0.469
Call Rate 0.154 7.673 *** 7.329 *** 1.739 1.097 0.686 0.397 0.356 2.316 0.947 0.789 0.354 2.032
REER 5.274 ** 3.381 ** 3.327 * 3.043 * 0.919 0.851 1.618 0.909 0.464 0.671 1.251 1.063 0.317
CPI 0.585 2.302 1.408 0.310 0.728 0.994 1.157 0.581 3.906 ** 1.754 2.706 * 2.084 1.646
M2 0.443 3.380 * 0.628 0.295 1.237 1.338 0.866 0.389 0.545 0.634 0.498 0.233 1.119
Yield 3.422 * 0.482 0.402 0.135 0.342 0.475 0.187 0.374 0.909 0.785 0.656 0.184 1.852
Nikkei 1.949 1.983 1.203 2.611 * 1.118 1.139 1.235 5.730 ** 0.642 0.471 1.430 1.738 0.628
Lend 1.436 0.896 0.274 1.170 2.298 3.049 * 2.081 0.970 0.782 1.535 1.110 0.804 1.934
Prod 1.135 0.592 0.889 0.188 2.288 1.628 6.034 *** 2.163 0.618 0.427 0.189 0.648 2.480
Note: 1 The period is from April 2001 to March 2006;   April 2006 to August 2008;
 September 2008 to Feburary 2011, and March 2011 to August 2013.
 2 Calculation based on the average of 1st to 4th lags of the variables 
䚷䚷䚷䚷3 Figures are F-value. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
Source: Author's calculation based on IFS database (IMF), Bank of Japan
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Call Rate, on the other hand, Granger Causes industrial production during 
the periods 2001-2006 and 2008-2011. The real effective exchange rate (REER) 
Granger Causes Call Rate and industrial production, while the direction of 
Granger causality from Call Rate to REER is not significant during the same 
period. These results sugget that the depreciation of yen during the period 2008-
2011 is related to the interest rates, including Call Rate.
Bank lending Granger causes industrial production in a limited scale during 
2006-2008 ; however, it is negatively correlated during the period. This indicates 
that the money has not been fully utilized for the domestic real economy.
Real effective exchange rate (REER) has granger causality with industrial 
production during 2008-2011. On the other hand, REER has no causality with 
BOJ Current Account (BOJAC) during the same period, and this could be caused 
by global monetary flows after the Lehman shock. It could be also accounted for 
by the fact that BOJAC and Monetary Base have no significant causality with 
domestic monetary market variables.
3.4  Variance Decomposition: The Influence of Monetary Policy Variables on the 
Domestic Real Economy
The analysis on variance decomposition shows that from which variables share 
variance is formed. The impact of the monetary policy on the real economy is 
analysed by variance decomposition of each monetary policy variables (BOJ 
Current Account, Monetary Base, Call Rate), as shown in Table 3. The variance 
decomposition indicates the share percentage of variables of real effective 
exchange rate(REER), and Nikkei average stock price (Nikkei), bank lending 
(Lend), industrial production (Prod), and monetary policy variables are included 
in the decomposition in the analysis. Thus, this analysis will identify the effects of 
monetary policy on exchange rate, stock prices, lending , as well as production 
through the degrees of variance decomposition.
The shares of BOJ Current Account in variance decomposition of industrial 
production were 16.1%(10th lag period, heareafter) and 17.0% during 2006-2008 
and 2008-2011, respectively, but it declined to 3.6% during 2011-2013. The share 
of monetary base in industrial production also declined from 10.4% during 2008-
2011 to 2.2 % during 2011-2013.
On the other hand, the shares of BOJ Current Account and Monetary Base in 
variance decompositions of lending remained relatively low over the whole period 
2001-2013.
The share of real effective excgange rate (REER) has significant importance 
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in variance decomposition in all the variables of bank lending and stock prices 
(Nikkei). Particularly, the share of REER for Nikkei among the decomposition 
including BOJAC was only 4.8% during 2001-2006, but it increased to 40.1% 
during 2011-2013. Similarly, the share of REER for Monetary Base and Call Rate 
increased from 4.97% to 45.3% , and from 8.1% to 41.0%, respectively, in the same 
period.
The results indicate that monetary policy variables have become increasingly 
innefective in industrial production, bank lending and stock prices. Also note that 
REER has increasingly influenced on the stock prices and bank lending. This 
could be due to the fact that the domestic real economy and financial markets 
have become increasingly influenced by capital flows and foreign exchange 
transactions after the Lehman Shock until recently. Thus, the impact of capital 
flows on the domestic markets and economy will be analysed in the next section.
Table3: Variance Decomposition of BOJ Account, Monetary Base and Call Rate 
3102-11021102-80028002-60026002-1002
BOJ Account䚷䋻 Production
 PeriodBOJACREER Nikkei Lend Prod BOJACREER Nikkei Lend Prod BOJACREER Nikkei Lend Prod BOJACREER Nikkei Lend Prod
1 12.78 3.248 0.292 1.368 82.31 27.31 16.72 1.812 1.369 52.78 14.66 22.60 0.677 0.008 62.06 3.613 0.002 0.906 1.180 94.30
10 11.87 3.279 5.845 1.445 77.56 16.11 27.99 10.73 15.17 29.99 16.95 45.53 0.674 11.78 25.07 3.592 3.054 3.450 12.09 77.81
BOJ Account䚷䋻 Lend
 PeriodBOJACREER Nikkei Lend Prod BOJACREER Nikkei Lend Prod BOJACREER Nikkei Lend Prod BOJACREER Nikkei Lend Prod
1 0.50 0.237 1.181 98.08 0.000 0.44 1.259 1.132 97.17 0.000 0.04 0.03 5.820 94.11 0.000 7.478 14.30 5.256 72.97 0.000
10 4.19 0.344 4.294 89.31 1.870 8.755 4.954 11.11 70.21 4.972 8.85 17.47 3.395 67.15 3.129 7.071 18.10 8.570 57.57 8.693
BOJ Account䚷䋻 Nikkei
 PeriodBOJACREER Nikkei Lend Prod BOJACREER Nikkei Lend Prod BOJACREER Nikkei Lend Prod BOJACREER Nikkei Lend Prod
1 7.29 1.587 91.13 0.00 0.000 37.24 0.59 62.17 0.00 0.000 3.736 39.16 57.10 0.000 0.000 1.200 43.98 54.82 0.000 0.000
10 11.89 4.770 81.78 0.29 1.272 25.65 7.32 39.35 9.81 17.87 26.26 29.51 33.73 5.557 4.937 9.987 40.10 47.57 0.150 2.190
Monetary Base䚷䋻 Production
 PeriodBOJACREER Nikkei Lend Prod BOJACREER Nikkei Lend Prod BOJACREER Nikkei Lend Prod BOJACREER Nikkei Lend Prod
1 7.94 3.327 1.183 1.753 85.79 3.57 0.571 6.885 8.073 80.90 0.87 24.81 0.897 0.005 73.42 2.068 0.046 0.878 1.449 95.56
10 7.86 3.423 6.824 1.734 80.16 2.727 1.540 9.399 24.71 61.63 10.42 48.01 2.441 11.66 27.48 2.243 3.399 3.301 12.42 78.64
Monetary Base䚷䋻 Lend
 PeriodBOJACREER Nikkei Lend Prod BOJACREER Nikkei Lend Prod BOJACREER Nikkei Lend Prod BOJACREER Nikkei Lend Prod
1 0.61 0.528 1.042 97.82 0.000 1.45 0.489 0.164 97.89 0.000 0.02 0.22 2.906 96.85 0.000 5.620 15.62 5.429 73.34 0.000
10 7.09 0.804 4.067 86.05 1.993 1.752 2.901 2.178 91.37 1.796 8.37 19.26 3.239 66.55 2.589 5.019 19.96 8.719 57.86 8.439
Monetary Base䚷䋻 Nikkei
 PeriodBOJACREER Nikkei Lend Prod BOJACREER Nikkei Lend Prod BOJACREER Nikkei Lend Prod BOJACREER Nikkei Lend Prod
1 2.65 0.585 96.77 0.00 0.000 1.42 29.55 69.03 0.00 0.000 1.335 47.36 51.31 0.000 0.000 0.039 48.06 51.90 0.000 0.000
10 3.72 4.971 90.83 0.19 0.289 1.875 27.58 52.55 3.89 14.12 19.20 38.64 38.32 2.140 1.701 6.275 45.27 47.08 0.064 1.306
Call Rate䚷䋻 Production
 Period CR REER Nikkei Lend Prod CR REER Nikkei Lend Prod CR REER Nikkei Lend Prod CR REER Nikkei Lend Prod
1 0.238 8.350 0.246 0.366 90.80 2.666 0.367 4.806 6.925 85.23 0.313 22.02 2.943 0.038 74.69 0.067 2.391 0.21 1.13 96.20
10 0.617 8.424 9.047 0.445 81.47 3.050 0.846 8.540 21.53 66.03 13.50 23.55 2.389 10.41 50.14 4.39 4.820 3.72 9.93 77.14
Call Rate䚷䋻 Lend
 Period CR REER Nikkei Lend Prod CR REER Nikkei Lend Prod CR REER Nikkei Lend Prod CR REER Nikkei Lend Prod
1 1.651 0.011 0.092 98.25 0.000 0.849 0.021 0.026 99.10 0.000 0.173 0.523 0.320 98.98 0.00 0.723 23.08 4.736 71.47 0.000
10 2.098 0.786 5.054 90.04 2.026 8.848 2.543 0.896 86.49 1.225 6.665 2.348 0.724 89.73 0.54 1.395 25.85 8.467 56.85 7.439
Call Rate䚷䋻 Nikkei
 Period CR REER Nikkei Lend Prod CR REER Nikkei Lend Prod CR REER Nikkei Lend Prod CR REER Nikkei Lend Prod
1 0.043 1.792 98.17 0.000 0.000 2.101 30.03 67.87 0.000 0.000 19.57 25.28 55.15 0.000 0.000 3.823 41.04 55.14 0.000 0.000
10 0.265 8.128 91.26 0.125 0.224 3.837 25.82 50.16 4.411 15.77 20.48 26.20 52.43 0.758 0.129 5.198 41.01 52.48 0.545 0.767
Notes䠖Standard errors are not shown in the table. Periods from 2nd to 9th in the variances are not shown in the table.
Source: Author's calculation based on the data of Bank of Japan
Hideaki OHTA
130  ( 130 ) 
4.  Effects of Monetary Policy on the Domestic Market and Economy
4.1  Impulse Response Functions: Monetary Policy Shocks on the Financial 
Markets and the Real Economy
In order to verify the effects of monetary policy (BOJ Current Account, Monetary 
Base, Call Rate) on the domestic economy, impulse response functions of the two 
VAR models are examined. The first model includes variables of bank lending, 
money stocks (M2), as well as government bond yield, to identify the effects of 
monetary policy instruments via financial markets and bank lending on industrial 
production. The second model includes variables of CPI, real effective eexchange 
rate (REER) and stock prices to test some effects on the production via exchange 
rate and stock markets. The two models are the same as the previous section (3.1).
[Model 1]： Effects of Monetary Policy on the monetary and financial market, 
aswell as   the industrial production [Fig7-1, 2, 3*]
Y = (BOJAC [or MB or Call Rate], M2, Yield, Lend, Prod), c
[Model 2]： Effects of Monetary Policy on the foreign exchange rate , price and 
capital market, as well as the industrial production [Fig8-1, 2,3*]
Y= (BOJAC [or MB or Call Rate]), REER, CPI, Nikkei, Production (Prod), c
*Appendix
In the above VAR models, the first variable is one of the variables related to 
monetary policy; Bank of Japan Current Account (BOJAC), Monetary Base, and 
Call Rate (overnight), followed by variables of monetary and financial markets as 
well as real economy. The results of impulse response functions are summarized as 
follows:
(i) Effects on the Real Economy
Over the period 2006-2013, the response functions of Bank of Japan Current 
Account (hereafter BOJAC) and Monetary Base (MB) show no significant impact 
on the industrial production (Fig.7-1, 7-2) 5. Although the shocks of the BOJAC 
and MB might have given some positive impact upon stock prices (Nikkei) during 
2001-2006, which could pushed up the production, there is no evidence of such a 
route of positive response from the monetary policy variables since 2006 (Fig.8-1, 
5. Iwata (2011) insists that BOJ’s monetary easing policy may not directly increase in bank 
lending, but the policy may change the expection of inlation among the public, which may 
activate stock tradings and increase monetary velocity, and that would result in increase in bank 
lending for investment. The impulse response functions based on the VAR model in this paper, 
however, show no such a significant response.
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8-2). The results of impulse response functions are in line with the results of 
Granger Causality test (Table 2).
The impulse response functions of Bank lending (Lend) to BOJAC and MB 
are not statistically significant, and even negative over the period 2001-2013, 
especially in recent period of 2011-2013, when MB increased significantly (Fig.7-1, 
7-2).  This indicates that the original objective of expanding production through 
bank lending by means of increasing monetary base has not been realized. 
Monetary base may be used for some other purposes such as financial investment 
in global markets recently.
The response of bank lending to call rate is insignificant during the whole 
period, while it shows negative response of industrial production during 2008-
2011 (Fig.7-3) . The result is conformed to that of Granger causality test (Table 2) 6. 
It may explain the fact that the interest rate could influence on the real economy 
during the period of Global Financial Crisis (2008-2011), however, the response 
function has become insignificant during 2011-2013. It should be noted that call 
rate has been set in principle in the narrow range of zero to 1 percent, and it 
might have nullified the interest rate policy in the past decade 7.
(ii) Effects on Monetary / Financial Market
Monetary Base (incl. BOJAC) has neither significant effect on the money stock 
(M2) nor the government bond yield (Fig.7-1, 7-2). This indicates that quantitative 
monetary easing policy has very limited effect on the bond market (Fig.7-1, 7-2). 
However, the impulse response functions during 2011-2013 indicate significant 
shock to the M2 and bond yield, which shows positive response, rather than 
negative one. This indicates that money stock in the domestic market has not 
been influenced by monetary base, and it implies that  monetary market has 
become influenced by capital flows, which are significantly correlated with the US 
monetary policy, especially after the QE 2 period.　The response of yield to Call 
Rate has no significance (Fig.7-3).
The response of yield to BOJAC and Moteary Base had not been significant 
until 2011, while the response became significantly positive during 2011-2013, 
which is not in line with the orthodox monetary theory (Fig.7-1,7-2) .
6. Miyao (2006) demonsted that increase in monetary base would raise the interest rate, which 
may have negative impact on industrial production. The study, however, the covered period was 
from 1975 to 1998, so that the result may not be hold in the current market in Japan.
7. Harada and Masujima (2008) indicate that Fisher effect which accounts for increase in the 
long-term interest caused by the increase in monetary base. However, their argument is not 
focused on the BOJ call rate involved.
Hideaki OHTA
132  ( 132 ) 
The impulse response of stock prices (Nikkei) to Monetary Base (incl.BOJAC) 
shows negative response, rather than positive one during 2008-2011 and 2011-
2013. This shows that monetary easing has not been effective for stock prices 
since the Global Financial Crisis, which is different from the period 2001-2006, 
when some positive response of Nikkei price was seen (Fig.8-1, 8-2) .
The above results show that BOJ’s monetary policy has very limited impact 
upon the domestic market. It should be also noted that the stock prices have no 
significant effect on the industrial production recently.
(iii)Effects on the Foreign Exchange Rate
Monetary base (incl. BOJAC) has not influenced on the real effective exchange 
rate (REER) over the whole period (2001-2011), while it has slight positive impact 
on the REER during the period 2011-2013(Fig.8-1, 8-2). However, the result of the 
Granger Causality test on BOJAC ( and Monetary Base) and REER shows no 
significant causality from BOJAC ( and Monetary Base) to REER during 2011-
2013.
(iv)Effects on the Price Level (CPI)
The impulse functions of CPI to the shock of BOJ Current Account and Monetary 
Base shows no significant response of CPI (Fig.8-1) .While the response function 
of CPI to Monetary Base shows positive response only during the period 2011-
2013, it is not statistically significant (Fig.8-2) 8. Call rate also has no siginificant 
effect on CPI.
8. Miyao(2009) indicates that the money stock has put no significant influence on the price 
lvels since 2000.
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Fig.8-1: BOJAC, REER, CPI, Nikkei, Production
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Japan: Impulse Response to Monetary Base [2]
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The above results of the impulse response functions on monetary policy 
variables (BOJAC, Base Money, and Call Rate) are summarized as follows:
First, the response of stock prices to BOJAC and Monetary Base (MB) shows 
no significant influence on the market and economy after the period of Monetary 
Easing (2001-2006), and there is even some negative response of the Nikkei stock 
prices to BOJAC and MB since 2008 until today. Monetary Base (and BOJAC) has 
not influenced on the money stock (M2) since 2006.
Second, Monetary Base and BOJAC have not put significant impact upon 
bank lending activities. This trend has become significant since 2006, when cross-
border capital flows increased significantly. In fact, the response functions show 
that bank lending to the BOJAC and Monetary Base has put negative impact on 
bank lending since 2011.
Third, Monetary Base and BOJAC have no significant impact upon the real 
effective exchange rate (REER) over the period from 2001-2011. It should be noted 
that BOJAC and Monetary Base put pressure on appreciation of the real effective 
exchange rate (REER) since 2011, rather than depreciation, which is contrary to 
the orthodox theory, where monetary expansion has put the exchange rate to 
weaken. Therefore, the foreign exchange rate under extremely low interest rate 
bound, is largely determined by some other factors, such as economic outlook and 
interest rate differences between Japan and foreign markets, especially the US 
market.
Fourth, the impulse response of REER to Call Rate is not statistically 
significant over the whole period (2001-2013). This result indicates that normal 
monetary policy in interest rate cannot be effective in the monetary market in 
Japan. It is also to be noted that REER has Granger cause industrial production, 
but it has no significant causality with BOJAC and call rate. It shows that normal 
monetary policy through the changes in interest rate cannot be effective.
Thus, the results of analyses based on the VAR model clearly indicate that 
BOJ’s monetary policy has become increasingly ineffective in stimulating the real 
economy through bank lending and other monetary policy instruments. Also noted 
that there is no effective impact of stock prices on the production through easing 
monetary policy (i.e. increase in the base money or BOJ Current Account).
5.The Effects of Capital Flows on Monetary Policy Instruments
Discussion in the previous section suggests that the BOJ’s domestic monetary 
policy has become very limited in controlling the domestic monetary market, as 
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well as the real economy recently. This section deals with the effects of capital 
flows on the monetary policy variables (BOJAC, MB, Call Rate), based on the VAR 
model, including the Granger Causality test and impulse response functions.
5.1  VAR (Vector Auto Regression) Model: Estimation of the Capital Flows on the 
Domestic Monetary Policy Instruments
The model deals with capital flow variables and monetary policy variables, and 
the Choleski ordering is determined as the shock of monetary policy variables and 
capital flows (net) as follows:
[Model 3]：Effects of (i)capital flows (net) on (ii)monetary policy variables
( i )  Foreign Direct Investment (FDI); Portfolio Investment (Portfolio); Other 
Investment (Other), Derivatives (Derivative)
( ii )  Monetary policy variables: BOJ Current Account Balance (BOJAC); 
Monetary Base (MB); Call Rate
5.2 Capital Inflows and Monetary Policy Variables: Granger Causality Test
As shown in Table4, causality between the capital flows and domestic monetary 
policy variables has become significantly increased recently.
Table 4: Japan: Granger Causality (2001-2013) 
2001-2006 FDI Portfolio Other Derivative BOJAC MB Call Rate
FDI 1.386 1.250 3.531 ** 0.832 0.509 1.328
Portfolio 1.358 1.758 4.248 ** 1.372 2.293 0.578
Other 0.811 1.573 4.518 ** 1.237 1.594 0.35
Derivative 2.888 * 2.725 * 3.739 ** 0.938 1.360 0.891
BOJAC 0.158 0.706 0.679 1.137 2.829 * 2.564 *
MB 0.100 2.034 1.525 0.766 0.561 1.110
Call Rate 0.661 0.124 0.22 0.492 2.036 1.225
2006-2008 FDI Portfolio Other Derivative BOJAC MB Call Rate
FDI 0.924 0.782 2.437 2.504 2.501 0.307
Portfolio 0.918 0.259 0.873 3.622 2.450 3.192
Other 0.770 0.570 0.862 3.020 2.282 2.570
Derivative 0.249 1.691 1.669 0.893 1.030 0.068
BOJAC 0.708 1.210 1.625 0.161 1.064 0.764
MB 0.782 1.910 2.090 0.198 2.070 0.62
Call Rate 1.661 0.651 0.831 0.849 0.314 0.18
2008-2011 FDI Portfolio Other Derivative BOJAC MB Call Rate
FDI 0.797 1.548 0.501 1.718 1.257 17.61 ***
Portfolio 0.701 0.256 1.257 5.501 *** 2.801 * 2.233
Other 0.855 0.398 1.233 4.237 ** 2.529 * 3.142 *
Derivative 1.453 1.936 2.248 3.131 * 4.359 ** 20.04 ***
BOJAC 1.467 1.140 1.492 0.934 0.781 1.406
MB 1.612 2.381 2.453 1.966 1.017 1.619
Call Rate 3.343 * 2.897 * 3.025 * 2.055 4.884 ** 2.048
2011-2013 FDI Portfolio Other Derivative BOJAC MB Call Rate
FDI 0.382 0.892 1.034 1.010 0.708 2.894
Portfolio 0.907 0.097 0.896 4.192 ** 3.689 ** 4.279 **
Other 1.261 0.752 0.522 3.169 * 3.100 * 4.016 **
Derivative 1.580 6.371 *** 2.876 * 3.620 ** 4.537 ** 2.046
BOJAC 1.566 5.300 ** 3.967 ** 3.549 * 1.656 1.557
MB 2.030 7.955 *** 5.020 ** 2.690 * 1.464 1.249
Call Rate 0.154 7.673 *** 7.329 *** 1.739 1.097 0.686
Note: 1 The period is from April 2001 to March 2006;   April 2006 to August 2008;
September 2008 to Feburary 2011, and March 2011 to August 2013
 2 Calculation based on the average of 1st to 4th lags of the variables 
䚷䚷䚷䚷3 Figures are F-value. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
Source: Author's calculation based on IFS database (IMF), Bank of Japan
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There are strong causal relationship between BOJ Current Account (BOJAC) 
/ Monetary Base and capital flow variables, especially short-term capital flows 
(portfolio, other investment, and derivatives) between 2011 and 2013. It should be 
noted that the causality between call rate and short term capital flows also 
became significant during 2011 and 2013, which was not observed until 2008.
This could be explained by the fact that short-term capital flows have become 
increasingly influenced on the domestic monetary policy variables, especially after 
the Global Financial Crisis. It could be result of increasing global capital flows in 
the post-Lehman Shock under the excessive liquidity provided by the major 
industrial countries, including the USA, EU and Japan. Thus, BOJ’s monetary 
policy has become increasingly difficult to control over the money stock and the 
financial market thorough the major monetary policy instruments.
5.3 VAR Model and Variance Decomposition of the Capital Flow Variables
The impact of capital flows (FDI, Portfolio, Other Investment, and Derivatives) on 
the monetary policy variables (BOJAC, MB, Call Rate) are analysed by the 
variance decomposition (Table 5).
Table 5: Variance Decomposition of BOJ Account and Monetary Base (2)
2001-2006 2006-2008 2008-2011 2011-2013
BOJ Account
 Period FDI BOJAC MB CALL FDI BOJAC MB CALL FDI BOJAC MB CALL FDI BOJAC MB CALL
1 0.83 99.17 0.00 0.00 21.07 78.93 0.00 0.00 7.45 92.55 0.00 0.00 4.85 95.15 0.00 0.00
10 2.60 96.01 0.64 0.75 24.43 65.10 8.93 1.54 19.08 70.00 2.90 8.03 27.94 63.66 4.21 1.83
 Period PORT BOJAC MB CALL PORT BOJAC MB CALL PORT BOJAC MB CALL PORT BOJAC MB CALL
1 0.04 99.96 0.00 0.00 0.01 99.99 0.00 0.00 7.73 92.27 0.00 0.00 9.32 90.68 0.00 0.00
10 13.08 84.32 1.16 1.44 24.20 69.81 5.95 0.04 16.50 58.59 4.56 20.35 18.81 74.80 3.03 3.36
 PeriodOTHERBOJAC MB CALL OTHERBOJAC MB CALL OTHERBOJAC MB CALL OTHERBOJAC MB CALL
1 1.04 98.96 0.00 0.00 1.25 98.75 0.00 0.00 5.36 94.64 0.00 0.00 3.21 96.79 0.00 0.00
10 1.07 98.38 0.52 0.03 15.45 74.05 10.08 0.42 18.49 64.36 1.49 15.66 12.61 81.66 1.65 4.08
 Period 㻰㼑㼞㼕㼢㻚 BOJAC MB CALL 㻰㼑㼞㼕㼢㻚 BOJAC MB CALL 㻰㼑㼞㼕㼢㻚 BOJAC MB CALL 㻰㼑㼞㼕㼢㻚 BOJAC MB CALL
1 3.70 96.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.0 0.00 0.00 2.16 97.84 0.00 0.00 2.75 97.25 0.00 0.00
10 3.89 95.65 0.44 0.03 3.32 85.70 9.84 1.14 17.87 75.09 1.48 5.56 5.67 81.93 3.90 8.50
Monetary Base 
 Period FDI BOJAC MB CALL FDI BOJAC MB CALL FDI BOJAC MB CALL FDI BOJAC MB CALL
1 1.71 72.90 25.39 0.00 19.60 52.64 27.76 0.00 0.02 69.68 30.31 0.00 8.67 85.55 5.79 0.00
10 2.28 72.42 24.98 0.32 21.88 46.59 29.26 2.28 6.78 63.25 26.80 3.17 22.96 64.96 8.10 3.98
 Period PORT BOJAC MB CALL PORT BOJAC MB CALL PORT BOJAC MB CALL PORT BOJAC MB CALL
1 0.00 70.45 29.55 0.00 0.13 72.99 26.89 0.00 0.38 59.03 40.59 0.00 5.45 87.13 7.42 0.00
10 10.03 63.40 25.77 0.81 11.99 61.80 26.17 0.05 16.24 45.12 30.96 7.68 13.73 74.36 9.18 2.73
 PeriodOTHERBOJAC MB CALL OTHERBOJAC MB CALL OTHERBOJAC MB CALL OTHERBOJAC MB CALL
1 3.77 52.39 43.84 0.00 1.13 74.31 24.56 0.00 0.06 64.03 35.91 0.00 0.40 93.20 6.40 0.00
10 3.73 54.03 42.22 0.02 7.58 63.60 28.59 0.22 13.00 53.67 27.92 5.41 11.15 78.79 7.08 2.98
 Period 㻰㼑㼞㼕㼢㻚 BOJAC MB CALL 㻰㼑㼞㼕㼢㻚 BOJAC MB CALL 㻰㼑㼞㼕㼢㻚 BOJAC MB CALL 㻰㼑㼞㼕㼢㻚 BOJAC MB CALL
1 0.41 55.16 44.43 0.00 1.01 76.40 22.59 0.00 8.25 60.36 31.39 0.00 1.17 92.07 6.76 0.00
10 0.53 56.58 42.87 0.02 2.71 69.02 27.64 0.62 14.61 56.98 26.25 2.17 5.38 76.50 10.62 7.50
Call Rate
 Period FDI BOJAC MB CALL FDI BOJAC MB CALL FDI BOJAC MB CALL FDI BOJAC MB CALL
1 0.70 1.82 1.33 96.15 21.18 0.80 1.81 76.20 2.44 5.11 6.49 85.95 6.02 48.90 0.17 44.90
10 3.63 2.50 1.40 92.47 21.32 0.98 6.92 70.78 54.43 4.55 4.18 36.84 39.04 33.79 3.73 23.44
 Period PORT BOJAC MB CALL PORT BOJAC MB CALL PORT BOJAC MB CALL PORT BOJAC MB CALL
1 0.22 2.47 1.80 95.52 19.60 52.64 27.76 0.00 0.47 4.54 8.65 86.34 2.76 47.04 0.78 49.42
10 1.11 2.74 2.74 93.41 21.88 46.59 29.26 2.28 0.71 4.47 14.12 80.70 2.95 48.39 5.16 43.50
 PeriodOTHERBOJAC MB CALL OTHERBOJAC MB CALL OTHERBOJAC MB CALL OTHERBOJAC MB CALL
1 0.00 2.24 1.66 96.10 3.63 2.60 0.50 93.28 11.12 6.90 3.88 78.11 0.30 50.84 1.56 47.30
10 0.75 2.53 2.45 94.27 6.50 2.50 6.57 84.43 18.20 7.06 6.03 68.71 2.27 50.95 6.14 40.64
 Period 㻰㼑㼞㼕㼢㻚 BOJAC MB CALL 㻰㼑㼞㼕㼢㻚 BOJAC MB CALL 㻰㼑㼞㼕㼢㻚 BOJAC MB CALL 㻰㼑㼞㼕㼢㻚 BOJAC MB CALL
1 5.60 4.23 0.86 89.30 0.51 7.45 1.31 90.73 0.31 19.13 0.73 79.83 0.02 54.25 1.34 44.39
10 6.18 4.43 1.30 88.09 1.11 7.17 9.45 82.27 64.27 9.18 2.99 23.57 9.35 53.34 2.79 34.53
Note䠖Standard errors are not shown in the table.
Source: Author's calculation based on the data of Bank of Japan
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While capital inflows had not put any significant impact on the BOJ Current 
Account (BOJAC) as well as monetary base (MB) during the period 2001-2006, the 
result of variance decomposition shows increasing influence of capital flows on the 
monetary policy variables in recent years, and the results indicate the following 
facts:
First, the share of FDI of variance decomposition among all the monetary 
policy variables (BOJ Current Account, Monetary Base, and Call Rate) increased 
substantially after 2006 until recently. This fact indicates that monetary policy 
variables have become increasingly influenced by even relatively long-term 
investment as FDI recently. It could be due to the fact that capital flows under the 
category of FDI, including M&A and other forms of transactions have become 
financial transactions of short-term investment.
Second, the shares of variance decomposition of portfolio investment and 
other investment among the Monetary Base increased significantly during 2006-
2013, as copared with the period 2001-2006. Thus, the capital flows, especially 
short-term investment flows, have increased the share of decomposition among 
the Monetary Base recently.
The share of derivatives of variance decomposition of all the monetary policy 
variables (BOJ Current Account, Monetary Base, and Call Rate) increased 
substantially especially during the Global Financial Crisis period (2008-2011). 
Particuyalrly, the increase in the share of derivatives among the call rate indicates 
the fact that unstable short-term transactions thourgh derivatives increased 
substantially, especially duing the ‘Post  Lehman Shock’ period of 2008-2011.
The results of variance decomposition on the monetary policy variables 
indicate that capital flows have played significant role in money/financial 
markets, and influenced on the BOJ urrent Account, Monetary Base, as well as 
Call Rate since 2006. Particularly, the impact of capital flows on the monetary 
policy variables during the post-Global Financial Crisis has increased 
significantly. The next section deals with Impulse Response Functions, which 
indicate that the impact of capital flows on the domestic monetary policy variables 
increased substantially.
5.4 Impulse Response Function Capital Flows and Monetary Policy Indicators
The influence of capital flows on the monetary policy variables (BOJ Current 
Account, Monetary Base, Call Rate) are analysed by the impulse response 
functions (Fig.9-1, 9-2, 9-3, 9-4) .
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Fig.9-1: FDI, REER, BOJAC, Monetary Base, Call Rate
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Fig.9-2: Portfolio, BOJAC, Monetary Base, Call Rate
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Fig.9-3: Other, BOJAC, Monetary Base, Call Rate
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Fig.9-4: Derivative, BOJAC, Monetary Base, Call Rate
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First, FDI has relatively small impact upon the response of monetary policy 
variables (BOJAC, MB, and Call rate) except during the period 2008-2011 (Fig.9-
1). During the post-Lehman Shock period, FDI outflows increased especially in 
Asia under the increasing pressure of appreciation of Yen. It could explain the rise 
of call rate, as FDI outflows increased the result is broadly in line with the 
Granger Causality test.
Second, portfolio investment has significant impact on the monetary base 
(incl. BOJAC) and call rate since 2006 (2006-2013), and the result is in line with 
the Granger Causality test. The impulse response function of BOJAC and 
Monetary Base to portfolio investment shows negative response both periods 
2008-2011 and 2011-2013 (Fig. 9-2). This suggests that portfolio investment has 
alternative sources to monetary base.
Third, the impulse response of BOJAC and Monetary Base to Other 
investment was limited during 2001-2006 (Fig.9-3). However, other investment 
has increasingly put impact on the monetary base and BOJAC during 2008-2011 
and 2011-2013. The impulse response of call rate also shows significant response 
to short-term capital flows.
Finally, although general impact of derivatives on the monetary policy 
variables were limited and insignificant during the period 2001-2006 and 2006-
2008, the effects of inflows of derivaives have increased since the Global Financial 
Crisis, especially during 2008-2011.
The above results indicate that short-term capital flows (portfolio, other 
investment, derivatives) have increased their influence on the levels of 
BOJCurrent Account and Monetary Base, as well as Call rate. Therefore, BOJ’s 
monetary policy has become increasingly influenced by capital flows which have 
put impact upon the monetary policy variables recently.
6. The Effectiveness of Monetary Policy in Japan
6.1 Ineffectiveness of Domestic Monetary Policy and Influence of Capital Flows
The results of the analyses in the previous sections indicate that significant 
monetary easing policy has become ineffective in the domestic monetary market. 
Such a change is probably caused by significant increase in the global capital 
flows which have affected the domestic monetary policy in Japan recently. Major 
points of the analysis are summarized as follows:
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( i )  The monetary policy instruments (BOJ Current Account, Monetary Base, 
Call Rate) have become ineffective in the financial market as well as the 
real economy; capital flows, especially short-term investments have 
become influenced on the monetary policy instruments and the market in 
Japan
( ii )  The change in call rate has become uncertain in the domestic market
(iii)  BOJ’s monetary easing policy has become ineffective in providing positive 
effect on the real economy, and it has no more causality with the 
productive activities even via stock prices since 2006, especially after the 
post Global Financial Crisis
(iv)  Monetary policy has no significant effect on the inflation rate (CPI)
( v )  There is no significant effect of monetary policy on the real effective 
exchange rate
(vi)  Monetary Policy has no direct causality with the industrial production 
and stock prices
Capital flows in the global market have increased significantly since late 
2000s, which have put substantial impact on the BOJ ’s monetary policy 
instruments. Therefore, the overall effect of monetary policy has become 
insignificant in influencing the economic activities and monetary market recently 9
With regard to foreign exchange rate and monetary easing policy, the effect of 
monetary policy on the real effective exchange rate (REER) is negligible and 
insignificant over the whole period(2001-2013). The causal relationship between 
Monetary Base (including BOJ Current Account) and foreign exchange market is 
not statistically significant. Yen exchange rate is more affected by the economic 
conditions of the US and other major countries, which is influenced by other 
factors, such as the difference in interest rates between the countries. In this 
respect, Yen’s depreciation since the early 2013 was mainly caused by several 
external factors, including the improvement in the US economy and monetary 
expansion expectation under the ‘Abenomics ’, widening the interest rate 
differenrtials between Japan and the US market due to the more robust recovery 
of the US economy, as compared with that of Japan, etc. The monetary easing 
9. Shirakawa(2008) pointed out that foreign banks’ utilization of excess reserve of the BOJ 
Current Account in mobilizing for investment in financial market, and that foreign investor’s 
influence on the central banks monetary policy.  This could be influenced by ‘excess liquidity’ 
caused by the US monetary policy, QE 2 and QE3 in particular, which have contributed to 
increase in liquidity in the global market.
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policy under new Governer Kuroda of BOJ might have induced currency 
depreciation though massive propaganda of ‘Qualitative and Quantitative 
Monetary Easing (QQE)’. However, the results of this paper‘s analysis based on 
the VAR models indicate that monetary easing policy has not put any statistically 
significant effect on the real effective exchange rate. In fact, the exchange rate is 
mostly determined by the foreign investors’ portfolio preference, which is 
influenced by the overall economic conditions that affects differences in interest 
rates between Japanese and the U.S. markets, as well as European market.
In summery, major monetary policy instruments could not put significant 
influence on the real economy, nor domestic monetary market. The result of 
impulse response functions of the VAR models shows that monetary policy 
instruments have not realized the originally expected effects, as shown in Table 6.
6.2  Expanding ‘Excess’ Reserves of BOJ Current Account and Financial 
Investment
As a new monetary easing policy of BOJ, Qualitative and Quantitative 
Monetary Easing Policy (QQE) was introduced in April 2013. However, the 
monetary policy through Base Money supply may not be utilized for investment 
activities for industrial production. The analysis conducted in this paper clearly 
shows that BOJ’s monetary policy instruments have had not directly causality 
Table 6: Effects of Monetary Policy 
Original 2001-06 2006-08 2008-11 2011-13
M2  MB + 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫
Call Rate 䕦 㸫 㸫 㸫 +
Yield MB 䕦 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫
Call Rate + 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫
Lend MB + 䕦 㸫 㸫 䕦
Call Rate 䕦 㸫 䕦 㸫 㸫
REER MB 䕦 䠉 㸫 㸫 㸫
Call Rate + 㸫 㸫 + 䕦
CPI MB + 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫
Call Rate 䕦 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫
Stock MB + 㸫 㸫 䕦 䕦
Call Rate 䕦 + 㸫 䕦 㸫
Prod MB + 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫
Call Rate 䕦 㸫 㸫 䕦 䕦
Notes  1 'Original' denotes originally expected effects.
2 䠇denotes increase or appreciation䠗䕦 denotes minus effects or
decrease䠗 - denotes insignificance in the impulse responses.
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with any monetary variables nor real economy (reduction) during the whole 
period (2001-2013).
The excess liquidity in the BOJ Current Account may be utilized for financial 
investment in the global market, while bank lending has been stagnated even 
under the extremely monetary easing policy in massive scale, which is now 
common to advanced ecomomies, especially Japan and the USA. The monetary 
easing policies, therefore, may accelerate ‘carry trade’ for capital and financial 
investment in the global market 10.
The share of foreign banks among the BOJ Current Account amounted to 9.3 
trillion Yen, which is larger than that of regional banks (9.2trillion Yen), and trust 
banks (7.7 trillion Yen) in September 2013(Fig.10-1). Foreign banks could utilize 
the reserve at the BOJ Current Account for the investment in government bonds 
or Yen carry trade through the accounts between the central office and foreign 
branches, and the share of the latter has increased substantially 11. It should be 
noted here that the minimal required amount of the BOJ Current Account is 31 
billion Yen, while the actual amount is about 300 times of the required reserve 
amount. The excess reserve amount of foreign banks is substantially larger than 
that of Japanese commercial banks, which is 10 times of the minimum amount. In 
this regard, Fukuda (2011) pointed out that the excess reserve may be utilized for 
investment in the global market. As shown in Fig10-2, the US stock prices have 
risen with the increase in excess reserve of the BOJ Current Account. Kikuchi 
(2013) also suggested that under the excessive monetary easing, liquidity could be 
used for ‘speculative’ investment 12. Thus, the reserve money is not utilized for 
productive investment but financial investment for securities, currency and other 
derivatives globally.
10. Fukuda(2011) suggests that foreign banks in Japan may utilize the excess reserve of the 
BOJ Current Acount and call market for short-term investment in the monetary/ financial 
market, not in lending to manufacturing industry.
11. Morita(2013) indicated that Yen carry trade has increased, due to such a trade by foreign 
banks.
12. Kikuchi(2013) pointed out the fact that monetary easing in fact has provided ‘Hedge 
Funds’ with important resources for financial investment. Foreign banks may mobilize the 
resources delivered in the Japanese market, and they transfer the money to the Headquarters to 
be lend to ‘Hedge Funds’ that trade stocks in the Tokyo market, which accelerated the exchange 
of yen to dollars. Depreciation of yen would cause the stock prices higher in recent years, since it 
would enlarge the yen denominated corporate profit.
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Therefore, excess reserves of BOJ Current Account are possibly utilized for 
financial investment globally. This could be one of the reasons why the monetary 
policy has become ineffective in stimulating the real economy though increase in 
bank lending, while bank lending has become ineffective in productive activities 
in Japan. It should be also noted that capital flows have increasingly influenced 
not only on the foreign exchange rate but also domestic financial market.
The global monetary policy, particularly the US monetary policy, has put 
significant impact upon the global market in recent years. The quantitative easing 
3 (QE3) initiated in September 2012 was initially confined to the MBS(mortgage 
backed securities) trading, but it was extended to the purchase of Government 
Bonds (T-bills) by FRB in December 2012, which accelerated liquidity supply in 
the global market through carry trade and other means. However, the termination 
of QE3 foreseen in 2014 may put pressure on the monetary policy in Japan. This 
is because the current BOJ’s Qualitative and Quantitative Monetary Easing 
Fig.10-1: BOJ Current Account (Foreign Banks)
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Fig.10-2: BOJ Current Account (Foreign Banks) & US share prices
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policy might be expected to continue to provide the global market with abundant 
liquidity, as a ‘safety net’ of global money supply, after the termination of the QE 3 
in the US market. However, global financial investments through carry–trade are 
not the original objective of the monetary easing policy in Japan, which should be 
used for reviving the domestic economy rather than the global market, where 
speculative financial investment by hedge funds and other institutional investors 
are increasing significantly.
Concluding Remarks
This paper analyses the impact of monetary policy on the financial market, 
foreign exchange and the real economy, based on the VAR models over the period 
between April 2001 and August 2013, which covers the Quantitative Easing Policy 
(2001-2006), Comprehensive Monetary Easing (2010-2011), as well as the latest 
Qualitative and Quantitative Monetary Easing (QQE) Policy (2013). The result of 
the analysis based on the VAR models shows that monetary policy instruments 
have not realized the originally expected effects, and the results are summerised 
as follows:
First, BOJ’s monetary policy instruments (Current Account, monetary base, 
call rate) have become ineffective in controlling the monetary and financial 
market, as they have not put positive and significant impact on the monetary 
market, especially money stock (M2).
Second, there has not been any significant increase in bank lending by 
increasing monetary base, and no significant positive effect on the real economy in 
terms of industrial production is observed. In this regard, any effect of monetary 
easing on industrial production via stock market has not been observed since 2006 
until today.
Third, monetary easing in terms of increase in BOJ Current Account and 
monetary base on the real exchange rate and price levels, as well as industrial 
production, have not realized the expected results, especially during the period 
2008-2011, and 2011-2013.
Fourth, call rate has not provided significant effect on the monetary and the 
real economy, especially in the post Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2013.
Lastly, capital flows, especially short-term capital flows(Portflio, Other 
investment and Derivatives), have put significant impact upon the monetary 
policy variables (Monetary Base, BOJ Current Account, Call Money).
As shown in the analysis in this paper, it would be now difficult to have 
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significant impact on the market by the BOJ’s monetary policy only under the 
increasing capital flows. Therefore, quantitative easing monetary policy has very 
limited effect on the real economy, while the capital inflows and outflows have had 
causality with the BOJ’s monetary policy variables (BOJAC, MB, Call Rate) 
significantly in recent years. In this context, the US monetary policy, particularly 
QE2 and QE3 have significant impact on the global market though providing 
excessive liquidity, and encouraging carry- trade for short-term investment 
globally 13. In the case of Japan, the excess reserve of the BOJ current account 
might have accelerate financial investment through the carry trade, which is 
supposed to have increased under the BOJ’s QQE (Qualitative and Quantitative 
Monetary Easing Policy). The effect of QE3 (especially since December 2013, when 
T-bills were added in the trading by the FRB) is significant on the capital and 
foreign exchange market in Japan.
Therefore, Bank of Japan needs to conduct monetary policy in consideration 
of the global market situations, including the US monetary policy in cooperation 
with the government authority (MOF). Thus, Bank of Japan is expected to take 
sensible monetary policy in the context of the global economic and market 
conditions, especially the international capital flows, which are significantly 
influenced by the monetary policy of advanced economies. Accordingly, the 
monetary authority may have to coordinate with the major overseas monetary 
authorities, especially FRB, in considering the effects of monetary policies on the 
global economy and markets. In this sense, some capital account and financial 
management may be considered to attain Japan’s independence on the domestic 
monetary policy in the medium to long term perspective.
13. The significant rise of stock price in Tokyo in Spring 2013 might be the resul of investors’ 
expectation of the Japanese authority’s stance in the monetary policy, rather than the actual 
change in the monetary base, and it was only after April 2013 that the stock price (Nikkei, etc.) 
reached its highest level in the past few years. Since this paper covers the period until August 
2013, the analysis could not fully cover the period of monetary expanding period to be expected 
to reach over 200 trillion in 2014/15. However, It is now clear that the additional monetary base 
would not be effective in expanding the real economy, but it could be utilized for global financial 
investment through carry trade.
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